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　　This essay briefly discusses some of the factors that influenced decisions made by the Bush administration regarding the 
preemptive strike and the subsequent ongoing war in Iraq. US Foreign policy concerning Iraq and some of the justifications 
for the US led invasion in 2003 will be discussed, as well as some outcomes of the war. Finally, some similarities between 
the Iraq and Vietnam wars (mid to late 1960s) will be covered.
1. Introduction
　　Post 9/11, the United States was attempting to come to terms with the ‘new world’ (Powell cited in 
Crawford 2003), and prevent similar terrorist attacks in the future. Consequently, US foreign policy was 
strengthened to reflect the changes in global security and to combat the threat of terrorism (Cheney 2001, cited 
in Crawford 2003). The strategies and policies pursued however, such as regime change, claims about Hussein’s 
WMD arsenal, and supposed links between Iraq and al-Qaeda, were ambiguous, misleading and in some cases, 
fabricated (Yglesias, cited in Kazin 2008). The preemptive war and regime change in Iraq drew condemnation at 
home and abroad, as well as heightened claims that America was not acting in the interests of securing freedom 
from tyranny, oppression and liberty for Iraq. As noted by Walzer, Iraq is the only entity capable of facilitating 
the establishment of a new mode of governance and bringing about lasting peace, freedom and liberty (2004). 
　　The Bush administration’s decisions, states Kagan, are shaped by the principle of “maintaining their 
predominant influence in regions that matter to it, and excluding the influence of other great powers (2008).” 
Its justification for its Iraq campaign and continuous rhetoric about preserving freedom, justice and liberty, the 
exaggeration of WMD threats, and apparent ignorance toward lessons learnt from chaos that accompanied the 
Vietnam War will be briefly discussed. There have been some positive outcomes of the Iraq War, although they 
mostly pertain to financial growth and factors regarding lifestyle betterment, and access to modern commodities 
taken for granted in the West (O’Hanlon 2010). Profits, GDP and lifestyle surveys aside, the loss of civilian 
and military life combined with the increased fragmentation of Iraqi society has rendered any gains fruitless. 
Operation Iraqi Freedom has served to instil insecurity and oppression amongst the people of Iraq (Chernus 








2006). Moreover, the US is now more likely to have to contend with heightened tensions and possible threats 
from other states or terrorist organizations not approving of its thrust to Westernize and establish democracy in 
the Middle East. Although the US strategy for victory in Iraq in its current manifestation appears to failing, it 
could bear fruit and lead to stability in the Middle East, as predicted by the Bush administration. In reference 
to Niebuhr however, I agree that once again the “recalcitrant forces” in history appear to be haunting American 
foreign policy (cited in Bacevich 2009).
2. The Masterminds
　　First of all, it is important to rewind history to the post-Cold War period, as this was arguably when the 
effects of liberal US foreign policy began to lay the foundation for the global security threats to be experienced 
throughout the 1990s, culminating in the terror attacks of 9/11. Smith ascertains that “the strengthening and the 
new offensive outlook of US foreign policy actually took place in November 9 1989, the date commemorating 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, not September 11 2001” (2009). The liberal internationalists influencing US foreign 
policy at this time were focusing on gaining consensus for policies that would support the US role as hegemon 
and its ability to spread democracy and freedom (Ikenberry 2009). The “Democratic Peace Theory” was widely 
accepted therefore, spreading democracy would reduce conflict and increase capitalism, liberty and freedom. 
This US policy of spreading peace, democracy and liberty is evident in the policies of many former presidents 
right back to its champion Wilson, hence the tag, “Wilsonianism” (Ikenberry 2009). According to Zakaira 
however, “the democratic peace theory is actually the liberal peace theory. The democratic peace theory is real, 
but it has little to do with democracy” (2007). Former Secretary of State Albright of the Clinton administration 
sums up the attitude of the US administration: “If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the 
indispensable nation. We stand tall, and we see further than other countries into the future” (Albright 1998, in 
Smith 2009). 
　　Bush is said to be ‘beating a well-worn path’, and that will continue with the following US administrations 
(Kagan 2008). Ikenberry however, wrote “in the instance of the Bush administration, it advanced the liberal 
actions and strategy of previous administrations to the extent of displaying a ‘new logic of global order’” 
(2009). The differences between traditional Wilsonian vision and Bush’s take on it were summed up by Jervis: 
“Bush wanted to make the world democratic so that the US would be safe, rather than Wilson’s vision of 
making the world a safe place for democracy” (cited in Ikenberry 2009). According to Bacevich, “Bush has not 
turned his back on long established policy ideals; he has actually returned to them” (cited in Kazin 2008). As 
briefly illustrated above, US foreign policy for the last century has been characterized by the desire to spread 
democracy and Western liberal values. This notion of expansion and hegemonic control illustrates historical 
links and consistencies in US foreign policy. 
　　The catalyst of 9/11 and the dissatisfaction with liberal policies allowed a morphing of political thought, 
resulting in the “Bush Doctrine”. Smith claims however, “the policies underpinning the Bush Doctrine were 
actually formulated by neoliberals” (Smith 2009). Mearsheimer calls the ‘Bush Doctrine’ “Wilsonianism with 
teeth” (2005). Although Bush is often seen as or perceived to be a driving force or one of the masterminds of 
‘Bush Doctrine’, others in the White House such as the neoconservatives shaped its ideals and theories prior to 
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his tenure as president.
3. From Clinton to Bush
　　The neoconservative direction taken by Bush and co. differs from Clinton’s containment policies and 
neoliberal belief in multilateral action. The Clinton administration was positive and assertive in its policies 
and staunch in the defense of America’s interests however, it was characterized by a belief founded more in 
the projection of ‘soft power’ and diplomacy where suitable, and the acceptance of co-operation and power 
sharing in multilateral bodies such as NATO or the UN. In agreement, Yglesias suggests, “US power is most 
effectively used when applied to enforce international law” (cited in Kazin 2008). Change was also evident 
in the terminology used by Bush and Clinton to describe threats: Clinton used less aggressive terminology, 
whereas Bush most commonly referred to Iraq, North Korea and Iran as the ‘axis of evil’. The White House, 
according to Chernus, was able to garner public support and consent through simplistic slogans such as ‘They 
hate our freedoms’ and ‘They’re flat evil’ (2006). Interestingly, the “evil empire” was Reagan’s phrase of choice, 
in relation to the USSR (Knock 2009).
　　Clinton’s tenure in the post-Cold War era was by coincidence punctuated by public perceptions that threats 
from abroad had ceased to exist. Thus, consent for aggressive action or foreign policy would have been difficult 
to secure. (Pauly & Lansford 2005). The spread of peace and democracy seemed to now be unrestricted, which 
resulted in the famed liberal writer Fukuyama claiming it was “the end of history” (Fukuyama 1989, cited in 
Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2008). Such optimism, indecision and uncertainty about how to wield such power and 
conduct international relations suggested, “America was a superpower without a mission” (Cox in Baylis, Smith 
& Owens 2008). Those dissatisfied with Clinton’s liberal policies, such as the Project for the New American 
Century (PNAC) members, wrote to Clinton in 1998 to voice concerns such as regime change in Iraq, Hussein’s 
WMDs and securing US interests in the Middle East (PNAC 1998). They would later get their wish in a willing 
and seemingly more ideological and crusading President Bush (Yordan 2006). 
　　When Bush first took office however, he was not so interested in changing foreign policy. Former Deputy 
Secretary of State Armitage noted that there was a clear and visible similarity between the policies of Clinton 
and Bush in the initial stages of Bush’s presidency (cited in Moens 2004). Bush was quoted as saying, “Keep 
them (terrorists) isolated in the world of public opinion and work with our alliances to keep them isolated” 
(Halper & Clarke 2004).  This leads to the assumption that Clinton’s neoliberal policies were actually effective, 
even with their lack of aggressive power politics as Realists and Neoconservatives had demanded. The events of 
September 11 2001 however, ushered in a new era of offensive foreign policy and hard power projection. 
　　“Under the impact of 9/11, and the seductive arguments made by the neoconservatives that unilateral 
action alone was called for, many liberal internationalists joined Bush’s war party” (Smith 2009). One must 
question the right of a state to exert its influence in such self-righteous ways though, especially considering the 
internationally recognised norms of sovereignty and the right to self-govern, whether it is a Marxist dictatorship 
or a liberal democracy. Furthermore, the contradictory nature of the policies of the Bush administration did 
not appear to respect the freedom and liberty of other states, nor do they respect international conventions and 
rulings such as those stipulated by the United Nations Security Council. All evidence suggests that in some 
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respects, the US as a hegemon or colonial power, as were other great powers or dynasties throughout history, 
somewhat disinterested in and disrespectful of the peoples and cultures that it encroaches upon. 
　　Bush became a war president as a result of 9/11, and his approval with voters hit 92% in October 2001 
(Moens 2004). Bush asserted in his September 23 2001 address to Congress, “Whether we bring justice to our 
enemies, or our enemies to justice, justice will be done” (cited in Moens 2004). Once again such a self-righteous 
display by the US administration highlights the belief in itself as the saviour of the free world and a global 
policeman. According to Realist theory, the state is the absolute authority and protector of its own security. 
Some realists would not completely support this war however, as it undermines America’s position of power 
and this endeavour is arguably not in America’s best interests. The liberal notion of spreading peace through 
democracy and freedom was common rhetoric throughout Bush’s presidency. Former Secretary of State Rice 
said, “A new balance of power that favoured freedom would be experienced post 9/11” (cited in Chernus 2006). 
In true realist form, Kagan stated “Liberal order does not rest on ideas and institutions alone. It is shaped by 
configurations of power” (2008). 
4. Justification for Regime Change in Iraq
　　Bush signaled his intentions for regime change in Iraq, often citing WMD, freedom for Iraqi people, the 
need to implement security in the Middle East, and reducing the threats of terror manifesting there (2003). 
According to Walzer, brutality, inhumanity and murder were part and parcel of Saddam’s rule (2004). Hussein 
was also “guilty of past crimes and inhumanities” (Walzer 2006). Furthermore, there is the belief that Iraq’s 
crimes against humanity and indiscretions had long provided ample grounds and justification for US intervention 
(Nichols 2003). The fear of an irrational Hussein deploying WMD was the main justification for striking Iraq. 
Hussein’s cat-and-mouse game with UN weapons inspectors eventually wore thin on the Americans. Wolfowitz 
was quoted as saying “for bureaucratic reasons we settled on the issue of WMD, because it was the one reason 
everyone would agree upon” (cited in Hapler & Clarke 2004).  Krauthammer (in Rosen 2005) said, “After 
9/11, we don’t have the luxury of time.”  But according to Byers (2003), “no rational government would attack 
the US.” In fact, since 1992, America’s defense budget has accounted for approximately 40% of total global 
spending on defense and weapons technology (Cox 2002). Knock asserts though, that “once there proved to be 
no WMDs in Iraq, the administration ‘flip-flopped’ and began to emphasize a different rationalization for the 
war-that its purpose was to bring democracy to the Middle East” (2009). Belief in the WMD threat, though, 
was so prevalent that it could not really have been classed a misconception; even the intelligence community 
believed it (Kull, Ramsay & Lewis 2002). The switching between reasons, excuses and possible threats tends to 
be confusing, contradictory and at odds with the actual evidence used to justify war. 
5. Altering the Status Quo: Iran’s Gains
　　Stoessinger believes that “containment of Iraq was working and invasion was not necessary, as the 
sanctions in place and pressure being applied to Hussein just prior to the outbreak of war was actually producing 
positive results” (2008). The invasion of Iraq has altered the status quo in Iraq, and now the US has to deal with 
increased sectarian violence, a splintered society that was once relatively subdued due to Hussein’s control and 
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the Ba’ath party, and the stability or civil order maintained by the Iraqi Army and police force. Walzer said that 
“the containment of Iraq was both successful and unsuccessful; it prevented weapons development and mass 
murder, but it did not stop the war” (2006). Crawford summarizes the situation well, stating that “preventive 
wars short-circuit non-military means of solving problems” (2003). Once the Hussein dictatorship had been 
subdued, the balance of power in the Middle East was altered, and as a result Iran has become more vocal and 
provocative. Iran could also be suffering symptoms of the ‘security dilemma’: The US military presence close 
to Iran would understandably cause them to increase their military power to balance the threat posed. Perhaps 
this is why Iran is now more actively pursuing nuclear technology. Once again, the status quo has been altered, 
as Iraq was useful in keeping Iran ‘in check’. Another side effect of Iran’s increase in confidence and position is 
its ability to cause concern with Israel, which itself now is responding to Iran’s rhetoric and defiance. It is also 
worth considering the relative gains made by Iran. By default, they have advanced their position in the Middle 
East and arguably gained more credibility in the international scene through its defiance of the West, Israel and 
the US. Iran’s gains would be another reason why some realists would not approve of the conduct of the Iraq 
war. Iran’s rise and somewhat questionable trading practices, especially in relation to weapons purchasing from 
China, has acted to further undermine America’s position in the Middle East and quite possibly have created 
another potential flashpoint for the future.
6. Post “War” Criticisms of US Policy
　　Severe criticism has also arisen from handling and management of Iraq in the post-war period. There was 
“a clear lack of policy, direction and concern for the post-war rebuilding and stabilising stages” (Zakaira 2007). 
A striking example of poor vision and failure to understand the centres of power and politics in Iraq was the 
disbanding of the Iraqi army. This resulted in high unemployment, a surplus of young, fit and able men with 
little prospects, who as a result often turned to fundamentalism or terrorism as a means of securing an income 
and directing their anger towards the US. Further condemnation abounds, such as Dobbins’ comment, “The U.S. 
mission in Iraq lacks legitimacy and credibility and unless its role is changed, it will continue to inspire local 
resistance, radicalize neighboring populations, and discourage international cooperation” (2005). Kolodziej 
believes, “The US, like other empires, will fail because its reach was beyond its grasp” (2006). One fear is as 
the US decreases troop levels and withdraws, the radical and fundamental elements will further entrench and 
establish themselves and fill the vacuum left by the defunct Iraqi military and police force. As a result, Iraq 
would then truly become a fragmented state and the breeding ground for terrorists that it was heralded to be 
by the Bush administration. In contrast though, Kagan asserts, “It is optimistic to imagine that a diminished 
American position in the Middle East would lead to greater stability” (2008). Thus, although there has been 
overwhelming outcry at the ‘illegal’ invasion of Iraq by America and its ‘Coalition’, there are still parties 
that insist on the credibility and good intentions of the US and its Iraq policies. Just as in Vietnam, those who 
doubted or rebuked the US administration and its foreign policies were painted as unpatriotic, un-American 




　　There are arguably many parallels between the Vietnam War and the current Iraq War such as the public outcry 
in the US over sending American forces to far-off places to fight unpopular wars against an enemy that had apparently 
caused no harm to the US. Other ‘recalcitrant forces’ evident in the Iraq and Vietnam wars to be briefly discussed 
here are: The failure to understand the politics and history of other states, indiscriminate combat tactics and lack of 
empathy for civilians, and misleading the public about causes and justifications for war.  
　　The US failed to see the connection between its military presence in the Middle East and foreign policies 
to the attacks by al-Qaeda (Zakaira 2007). Similarly, increased US support and intervention in South Vietnam 
in some ways forced Ho Chi Minh to seek further assistance from his communist allies in Russia and China 
(Knight 2004). Consideration of Iraq’s desire or lack of regarding the push to democratize and liberalize was 
not factored into policy. Although Western states are arguably more open to and familiar with liberal notions of 
capitalism, democracy and certain civil freedoms or liberties, states such as Iraq are not. Kagan states that non-
liberals such as Iraq see Western ideals as oppression, not freedom (2008). The promise of freedom, liberty and 
increased wealth or prosperity through democratization has materialized in Iraq, as it did in Vietnam, though the 
masses often miss out as the wealth is retained by elites, corrupt officials, and government personnel (Moyar 
2006). If anything, the surge in black market activity coinciding with both wars led to inflated prices and further 
crime and corruption (Steibel 1972; Krepinevich 2005)
　　The ongoing chaos in Iraq resulting from poor management policies and at times indiscriminate combat 
tactics has swelled the ranks of insurgents, as in Vietnam. Civilian casualties, brutal treatment of and insensitive 
handling of non-combatants, and atrocities such as the Abu Ghraib prison torture scandal have undermined 
America’s already tainted reputation in the eyes of Iraqis (Ignatius in Brzezinski & Scowcroft 2008). Similarly, 
incidents such as the My Lai massacre, ‘Agent Orange’ use, and sexual assault or rape committed by US forces 
during the Vietnam War illustrated a lack of care for those whose freedom was apparently being fought for (Lewy 
1978). Unfortunately for the US, it is widely perceived as just the latest western power to colonize the Arab 
world (Zakaira 2007). Likewise, the US misunderstood Ho Chi Minh’s ambitions to rid Vietnam of colonial 
invaders, and as a consequence, America eventually replaced France as the new colonial master (Stoessinger 
2008). Instead of America bringing freedom to Vietnamese oppressed by Communism, it is now bringing 
freedom from Islamic fundamentalism for Iraqis. 
　　The phrase “winning hearts and minds” characterised both wars and it is not uncommon to see images 
from Iraq or Vietnam of US military personnel providing medical care, playing with children or throwing treats 
from atop of armoured vehicles. Much more understanding and effort however, is required by America than the 
Iraqi insurgents to attain victory (Krepinevich 2005). In Iraq as was the case in Vietnam, local support faded 
as the civilian population witnessed the transient and temporary nature of US securitization tactics for towns, 
villages or hamlets (Lewy 1978; Brzezinski & Scowcroft 2008). Thus US tactics often served to galvanize 
enemy support amongst civilian populations that were initially sympathetic to the US cause. Walt claims “being 
an international relations scholar is neither necessary nor sufficient for appointment to the NSC or other similar 
bodies” (2005). Perhaps herein lies one reason why Niebuhr’s ‘recalcitrant forces’ are persistent. 
　　Ambiguous and false intelligence reports about Iraq’s claimed WMD arsenal were constantly reported on 
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to garner support from Congress and the general public. Also, the media constantly spread insecurity and fear of 
Iraq and the Middle East to maintain support for the war and basically render any chance of a peaceful resolution 
to the crisis unattainable (Chernus 2006). The long held fear in America and the West in the 50s and 60s of the 
“domino effect” - countries falling to communism in Asia, resembles the Bush administration’s propaganda 
about anti-US forces linking up in Iraq and training for terrorist activities against the freedom-loving Western 
world (Bacevich 2009). Ironically, it was men such as Rumsfeld and the CIA who actually provided Iraq with 
a means to obtain such weaponry and intelligence and training during the Iran-Iraq War period (Bacevich 
2009). The US government also claimed North Vietnamese attacks on naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin in 
1964 as justification for declaring war (Lewy 1978). There was confusion over whether the North actually fired 
upon the US Navy vessel the Maddox, but nonetheless the information relayed was used to justify reprisals 
and eventually escalation into all out war (Stoessinger 2008). Both claims about Iraq’s WMD stockpiles and 
North Vietnam’s attack on the US in the Gulf of Tonkin were later proven to be inaccurate, inflated and untrue. 
Walzer asserts that America needs to consider its role in conflicts when there is doubt surrounding the legality or 
morality of any military action (2004).  Furthermore, great care needs to be taken to not turn local populations 
against American forces, as their support is a key requirement for victory (Walzer 2004).
8. Conclusion
　　We are now fortunate enough to have the hindsight and revelations that history provides. Although it is 
often argued that the US is wrong for its actions against Iraq, the masterminds acted in what were arguably the 
best interests of the US, at least in accordance with their own visions for where America needed to be for short-
term security guarantees and longer term stability and democracy in the Middle East. US aims for peace in the 
Middle East are an arguably true intention. However, doubts over the credibility and the justification for war 
still remain, and the US should have been more transparent about Hussein’s WMD arsenal and capabilities. The 
negative outcomes could have been avoided somewhat if the US had paid attention to lessons learnt from other 
conflicts such as in Vietnam. The US administration failed in their handling of the war and lack of direction 
and vision, the exaggeration of the Hussein’s WMD threat, and the wish to spread democracy, capitalism and 
liberalism in a state or region that was not accepting of it. Arguably, the main failure was to not completely 
exhaust political means for resolving conflict before use of military power. In the words of Otto von Bismark, 
“Preventive wars are suicide for fear of death” (cited in Jervis 2003).
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